"It was not a fight for a ceasefire, but for Trump"

He was probably the best-known face in the Ukrainian government, after President Volodymyr Zelensky, in the first two years after the Russian invasion. As Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba traveled the world on diplomatic missions and met regularly with European leaders — and even with President Joe Biden. Until, in September 2024, he was the most high-profile name to be removed from the government in Zelensky’s reshuffle.
Now retired from politics — Kuleba is currently a professor at the prestigious French university Sciences Po —, the former minister has no problem openly saying what he thinks about the current situation in his country. In an interview with Observador, in Lisbon, Dmytro Kuleba stressed that the negotiations in Turkey between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations were nothing more than a diplomatic maneuver to please US President Donald Trump. “In the last four months, there has not been a single moment when we were close to a ceasefire, because that was never the objective of these initiatives”, he says. This is a position taken by the Kiev government that does not shock him, especially because a victory for Ukraine at this moment would be “to stop the war without legally recognizing any loss of territory, nor Russia’s right to decide Ukraine’s future, for example in NATO or the EU”.
Kuleba admits that Zelensky’s tense meeting with Trump in the Oval Office benefited the Ukrainian president, especially in terms of domestic popularity, and he credits him for the way he managed to mend relations with the United States. But he has no doubt that the US administration has no desire to approve another military aid package for Ukraine, which poses a particular problem for Ukrainians with the Patriot missiles, “which will simply run out”. The rest, the former diplomat believes, will be helped by Europe, in which he places his hopes.
“I don’t know if Portugal has done any polls on this, but how do you think Portuguese citizens would answer the question: ‘Are you willing to send your children to die for the Baltic countries?’”
NATO, however, does not seem to share the same benevolent view: “Everything we know about Trump suggests that American soldiers will not die abroad,” he points out. This would mean that, in the event of a Russian attack on a country belonging to the Atlantic Alliance, everything would be in the hands of the Europeans. And here Kuleba foresees firm resistance from the opposition and the population: “I don’t know if Portugal has conducted surveys on this, but how do you think Portuguese citizens would answer the question: ‘Are you prepared to send your children to die for the Baltic countries?’ ,” he says.
Still on Portugal, Dmytro Kuleba thanks the support in the attempts to influence the PALOP countries and Brazil, but is categorical in stating that “it did not work”. Instead, he declares that the Portuguese Government should focus on increasing investment in Defense, so that “they do not make the basic mistake that all human beings and nations make, of thinking that the worst cannot happen to them”.
Now that he has been removed from power, the former minister is focused on academia, but he continues to give several interviews. Like this one, where the minister who many considered “too popular” and a possible shadow to the President acknowledged that he was removed and that he had rejected the position of ambassador to the US, which was offered to him as a consolation prize. He also did not rule out the possibility of returning to politics , perhaps with an eye on the future beyond Zelensky: “Is it possible for me to return, if I see that I have a real opportunity and the real power to help Ukraine on a different level? Yes, I will seize that opportunity ,” he promises.

JOAO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVER
I would like to start by talking a little bit about the current situation in Ukraine. We have a scenario where the Russian army continues to slowly conquer territory in the Donbass. At the same time, the offensive in Kursk seems to have stalled a bit. The US administration is very focused on negotiations. Do you think that the Ukrainian leadership is entering a new mindset in terms of negotiations, perhaps even considering giving in on some of the issues that were previously considered essential? Despite the slow advance of Russian forces in Ukraine, there are no conditions for negotiations, because in diplomacy, negotiations are made when there are levers to stop the attacking party. And there are no such levers. That is why President Zelensky will continue to politically defend the idea of negotiations, knowing that they will not start, because Putin has zero motivation to stop these days. That is the problem. As for the Russian offensive, yes, it is advancing, but it has been advancing slowly for six or eight months. None of these advances pose a critical threat to the Ukrainian front line. Unfortunately, as of today, I do not see any possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine.
We saw the tense meeting in the Oval Office between President Trump and President Zelensky. Meanwhile, Ukraine managed to have another meeting and reach the minerals deal… Do you think that was a diplomatic victory for Zelensky, the way he was able to recover from such a tense situation? It was clearly a success for him, both in bilateral relations with the United States and domestically. After the meeting in the Oval Office, of course, everyone was very frightened by what they saw there. But in Ukraine, in fact, the impact was the opposite, because support for President Zelensky increased among the population. There was a rallying effect around the flag, and in this case, Zelensky personifies that flag.
"From [Trump's] inauguration until recently, all the talk and initiatives were not about a ceasefire. They were about keeping Trump away from the enemy. For both sides. Russia was trying to prevent Trump from taking tough action and Ukraine was trying to change Trump's view of Ukraine and prevent him from siding with Russia."
Internally, was there a feeling that Ukraine had been humiliated? Of course. And domestically, it has benefited Zelensky, because his approval rating has gone up. From the time [Trump] took office until recently, all the talk and initiatives were not about a ceasefire. They were about keeping Trump away from the enemy. For both sides. Russia was trying to prevent Trump from taking tough action, and Ukraine was trying to change Trump’s view of Ukraine and prevent him from siding with Russia. So while everyone was talking about a ceasefire, in reality, this was all about Trump, not about the ceasefire.
Do you think it was just a question of image? Absolutely, yes. In life, as in international relations, it is important to understand the meaning, the substance, of what is happening, not just the surface. It is one thing to see the book on the shelf and everyone is talking about it. Reading the book is a completely different thing. Everyone was talking about a ceasefire, but in fact it was not a fight for a ceasefire, it was a fight for Trump. In the last four months, there has not been a single moment when we were close to a ceasefire, because that was never the goal of these initiatives.
How do you assess the US’s performance? Has President Trump changed his position? Recently, for example, Steve Witkoff said that the so-called referendums in the occupied zones were an indicator that people wanted to join Russia. In other words, it seems that there are official statements that point to a Trump administration that is not fully aligned with Kiev. With the exception of one instance when the Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing and military assistance to Ukraine, everything else was just talk. Whatever Mr. Witkoff said, it did not result in any real steps toward a deal, on any terms. There were many irritating statements, some even hostile toward Ukraine, but they were not actions, they were statements. Except for the decision I mentioned.
And that was reversed. Yes, it was reversed. Therefore, it is painful to hear these statements, but as long as they do not turn into decisions clearly against Ukraine, they can be tolerated.

JOAO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVER
How do you think Vladimir Putin views Trump's presidency? Do you think he hopes to manipulate him? He has only one fundamental interest in his relationship with Trump: to ensure that President Trump does not make decisions that increase economic pressure on Russia, especially on the price of Russian oil, and on military assistance to Ukraine. As for military assistance, I think Putin has a better chance of succeeding, because it is clear that President Trump is not going to launch his own military aid program to Ukraine…
It's been six months since the last program. It won't happen. But as far as sanctions are concerned, the situation is fragile for Putin. There are a lot of statements coming from Moscow, but in practice there are more attacks on the ground and in the air. And that's how things will continue.
In terms of military aid, do you think Europe has the capacity to replace the US? Europe has already stepped in. I recently saw the latest data and US assistance has shrunk dramatically, almost to zero, which means that Trump is only in the final stages of fulfilling what President Biden promised, and he is not stopping it. At the same time, EU assistance is increasing. The problem is that it is not being distributed equally among member states. Some have significantly increased support for Ukraine, others have not. Now it is a family matter, it is up to the EU countries to sit down, look each other in the eye and ask: “Does Europe have the capacity to increase support for Ukraine?” Absolutely. Will it continue to increase it? Yes. The question is only how long it will take until Europe starts producing weapons and buying more weapons from other markets.
Will it be enough to sustain Ukraine's military front? I think that if Ukraine and the EU act together in a coordinated manner, they will be able to meet the needs on the front line. The area where neither Ukraine nor the EU can replace the United States is in air defense, specifically the Patriot missiles that intercept Russian and North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine. This is the most sensitive point, because it is completely in the hands of the United States. If we do not find a way to buy these missiles from the United States, we will see a lot of news coming from Ukraine about the massive destruction of cities with ballistic missiles. Because they will simply run out.
"Putin sees that Europe has made the decision to start acquiring weapons, so it is logical: 'Why should we wait for them to become stronger before attacking them?' You should attack when the enemy is weak."
You have said in the past that if Putin conquers Ukraine, he will move on to another European country, perhaps the Baltics. Do you think he will not be afraid of NATO, that NATO is obsolete? I have changed my mind since then. I have looked at the data on Russian arms production and I think that under these circumstances – and this is a key phrase, under these circumstances – within the next five years Putin will be able to fight in the war in Ukraine and simultaneously launch a limited attack on a NATO country in Europe. He will have that capability. Many people in the European countries believe that he will not do that because they are protected by NATO. OK, let’s look… Again, not at the surface, but beyond that.
Shall we read the book? Exactly, read the book [laughs] . NATO is based on a number of assumptions. The first is that Putin will not dare to attack NATO because he is afraid of America. I think President Trump will stay in NATO, but he will not allow American soldiers to fight.
What does it mean that Article 5 ceases to be effective? He will say, “I can give you logistical support, I can give you intelligence support, but American soldiers are not going to die for Europe.” That is clear. Everything we know about Trump suggests that American soldiers are not going to die abroad. We have evidence of this, from how he behaved in Afghanistan and how he promised voters that he would not take America into another war abroad. So we have to look at the military capacity of European armies. Are European armies capable of fighting Russia effectively at the moment? No, they are not. I would say that there is a strong will in the Baltics, in Poland and Finland to defend their countries, but this is not a collective NATO effort. So why wouldn’t Putin do it? Yes, he would lose a few of his [military] divisions, but the difference is that European countries care about their soldiers and Putin does not. Finally, the final argument of those who say that Putin will not dare to attack is that it would mean World War III and a nuclear war. But this is a very primitive understanding of how wars work. If Putin attacks with troops on the ground, no one will respond with nuclear weapons. If no one attacks Russian territory, it will be just a local military operation on the ground, which Putin can find the resources to support. The other argument is that Putin sees that Europe has made the decision to start acquiring weapons, so it is logical: “Why should we wait until they become stronger to attack them?” You should attack when the enemy is weak. This is the list of arguments that, to me, explains why Putin will be tempted to launch an attack.

JOAO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVER
President Macron has put on the table the possibility of sending French soldiers to Ukraine, he has spoken of the possibility of sending European soldiers for peacekeeping efforts… He has said that the US is not prepared to let its soldiers die in Ukraine. Do you think European countries are? There will be no European soldiers in Ukraine in the foreseeable future. All these conversations have political importance, but they are completely irrelevant to current needs.
Ukraine needs weapons, not soldiers? Of course. If you listen carefully to European leaders, you will notice that they are talking about sending troops not even as peacekeepers, but as stabilization forces after a ceasefire agreement is signed and implemented. In short, let’s read the book again: they are not talking about using these stabilization forces to end this phase of the war. They say: “When there is a ceasefire, we will be ready to send stabilization forces to prevent the next phase of the war.”
Are they just pushing forward? Yes, it is not something that will solve the problem. We do not have a ceasefire, so… There is no point in having any hope for that. Another argument is that if you listen to these leaders, they say that they will send troops if America provides support from behind. But America does not accept that. Finally, I think that when this decision comes, there will be strong resistance to these governments from the opposition.
Why? Because they would be sending their boys to war, where they might die. I don’t want to sound cynical, but let’s not even talk about Ukraine. I don’t know if Portugal has done any polls on this, but how do you think Portuguese citizens would answer the question: “Are you willing to send your sons to die for the Baltic countries?”
Do you think there is no feeling of European support? No, I think this will be questioned. This resolute support will be questioned. And then it will be up to the leaders whether they give in to this pressure or whether they overcome it because they are committed to Article 5. Don't get me wrong, I hope NATO proves that Article 5 works, because it is the only way to save Europe from war. But there are many questions about whether it will work. Let me be very clear: I really hope it does.
Still believes in NATO, but… [Interrupts] No, Putin attacked Ukraine to subdue it. But he will attack an EU country for another reason: not to subdue it, but to prove that the promise of NATO and EU unity is false. His goal will be to say, “You see? This doesn’t work.” And to achieve that goal, he only needs a limited incursion. That’s why it’s so tempting for him.
“'It's impossible, how can we have war here?' How can a missile or a drone hit a building in Lisbon? The truth is that it can. Anyone can be tested."
Regarding Portugal, there is a lot of talk about how the Portuguese government can help Ukraine with its connections in Africa and Brazil, trying to get them to support the country diplomatically. From your experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs, did you think that was happening? We spent three years working very closely with our Portuguese colleagues to reach out to countries outside Europe where Portugal has connections. I would like to thank my colleagues in the Portuguese government, especially former Minister João Cravinho, with whom I worked most closely, for trying so sincerely to help. But did it work?
Lula da Silva went to Victory Day in Moscow… No, it didn’t work. We tried very hard, but we shouldn’t overestimate our joint influence outside Europe. We should continue these efforts to reach out to these countries and talk to them, but Portugal shouldn’t focus only on that, because the results will be very, very limited. I expect two things from every country in the European Union, including Portugal: first, that they invest in defense. This is not just about our defense, it’s about yours. Today, Ukraine is fighting for itself, but it’s also buying time for you, so that you can become stronger and send a clear message to Putin that says, “Don’t try to attack us, because we are strong enough.” Produce more weapons, contribute to a joint effort to buy weapons and produce them. Secondly, on a very human level, I urge you not to make the basic mistake that all human beings and nations make, of thinking that the worst cannot happen to you. It’s quite natural, Ukrainians are the same as the Portuguese. We also thought that the worst would not happen to us.
Is this what happened before the invasion? Of course, of course! “It’s impossible, how can we have war here?” How can a missile or a drone hit a building in Lisbon? The truth is that it can. Anyone can be tested. On a very human level, I ask you not to repeat this mistake and to base your decisions on the idea that the threat of war is real.

JOAO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVER
Looking at the sentiment of Ukrainians… In the past, you have said that if Ukraine were to reach an agreement or a ceasefire where there is a possibility of giving up territory, it would create a feeling of revenge and would hurt the politicians who signed such an agreement. But isn’t there a certain war fatigue that might lead people to think that this is better than being hit by missiles every day? Imagine I am walking down the street in Lisbon and I am attacked by someone who tries to rob and kill me. I will fight, right? Would we be talking about fatigue if it were a situation where we were fighting for our lives? Probably not. Would we get tired if the attacker was stronger, would we get exhausted? Yes, but we would keep fighting until the end of our energy. Of course we would. This is modern-day Ukraine. Is there fatigue? Absolutely.
But doesn't that mean giving up? It doesn’t. We begin to understand others better when we put ourselves in their shoes. So I ask your readers to imagine themselves in this situation: you are attacked in the street, what do you do? Do you say: “I’m tired of fighting, take my money and kill me”? No, it doesn’t work that way, we are human. And it doesn’t work that way with nations either.
So you are confident that there is no scenario in which Ukraine could give up territories? There is zero chance that Ukraine will say, “We are tired, we will agree to what you want to do.”
So you think the only possibility for Ukraine is to win by fighting? When we talk about winning or losing a war, we need to have clear definitions of what it means to win and lose.
What would be a win for Ukraine? In the circumstances we have today, it would be to stop the war without legally recognizing any loss of territory, nor the right of Russia to decide the future of Ukraine, for example in NATO or the EU. With the resources we have today, in these circumstances, this would be a victory for Ukraine. But then the scenario I described arises, neither Russia nor Ukraine will be satisfied with this, which means that it is only a matter of time before we have a new war.

JOAO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVER
He was the youngest foreign minister in Ukraine's history and was in that position when the invasion began. He left last year, and some say it was because he was too popular. Le Monde newspaper says he was offered the position of ambassador to the US. Is that true? And if so, why did he turn it down? Yes, I was offered the position of ambassador when the President informed me that he wanted another foreign minister. But I politely declined the offer for two reasons. First, because I was a minister for four and a half years, during the pandemic and the invasion, and my children who live in Ukraine have practically not had a father for those four and a half years. For me, going to Washington would mean being completely separated from my children for another four years. I would be in Washington and my son and daughter would be in Kiev under missile and drone attacks. I don’t think I would be a good father if I allowed that. The second reason is that — and it is much less important, there is an ocean of difference between these two reasons — but if the President no longer wants me as a minister, then what would be the point of being an ambassador? The position of ambassador in Washington requires total trust and connection with the President. My ego, my vanity, is filled with what I have achieved in diplomacy, I do not need a position to prove something to myself. I can be just as useful to Ukraine in a position as a citizen, and that is what I am doing.
"Am I looking to return to the Ukrainian government at this point? No. Is it possible for me to return if I see that I have a real opportunity and real power to help Ukraine on a different level? Yes, I will take that opportunity."
Are you ruling out returning to Ukrainian politics? There will be elections at some point. No. That’s life, we have a saying in Ukraine that “A man makes a decision and God laughs.” I spent 21 years serving the country in public service and government and I resigned twice. In both cases, I was brought back. Am I looking for a return to the Ukrainian government at this point? No. Is it possible for me to return if I see that I have a real opportunity and real power to help Ukraine on a different level? Yes, I will take that opportunity.
In 2023 you said you plan to write your memoirs in Kiev, in a “free and independent” Ukraine. Do you still believe that will happen? Absolutely. I have no doubt about it.
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